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Abstract
The notable increase in international reserve holdings over the past decade
and their use during the global ￿nancial crisis of 2008/2009 has sparked renewed
interest in the analysis of the optimal level of reserve holdings, in particular in
countries which are subject to sudden stops. Less attention has been given to
the optimal composition of reserves and even less to the joint determination of
level and composition. In light of current developments, we show that despite
the common belief that higher reserve levels should go along with higher diver-
si￿cation to minimize the opportunity costs from holding reserves, the opposite
may even be true. It depends on the factors that stand behind the increase in
reserves whether increased diversi￿cation is optimal or not. We estimate for a
panel of 20 countries the determinants of the currency composition of reserves
and show how it is a⁄ected by the di⁄erent motives of reserve accumulation. In
line with the recent literature on reserve levels we ￿nd that reserve accumula-
tion is primarily driven by precautionary motives, which in turn underpins the
allocation of reserves to safe assets. While we ￿nd primarily evidence of the
allocation being a function of precautionary motives, we also ￿nd some weak
evidence for reserve accumulation to lead to more diversi￿ed portfolios if reserve
accumulation is driven by other factors than precautionary motives.
Keywords: Reserve Accumulation, Currency Composition, Precautionary Motives
JEL Classi￿cation: F31, F33, E42, G115
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Non-Technical Summary
The notable increase of foreign exchange reserve holdings by emerging market cen-
tral banks ￿ which was only temporarily interrupted during the 2008/09 crisis ￿has
triggered a debate on whether central bank reserve portfolios should be more diver-
si￿ed across currencies and asset classes. Traditionally, central banks have invested
the bulk of their foreign exchange reserves into low-yielding government securi-
ties mostly denominated in US dollars. Since the level of reserves accumulated by
many emerging market central banks has started to exceed conventional measures of
appropriate reserve holdings for precautionary balance-of-payment purposes, some
observers have started to wonder whether reserve accumulation will eventually also
lead to more widespread reserve diversi￿cation.
Yet the empirical evidence supporting such reasoning has been scarce. According
to IMF data, aggregate currency shares in global reserves have remained relatively
stable over the past years, despite large increases in reserve levels. In addition,
the available evidence from countries which publicly disclose such information sug-
gests that higher reserve levels might be even associated with less diversi￿ed reserve
portfolios.
In this paper, we propose a possible explanation for such a negative relationship
between reserve accumulation and reserve diversi￿cation: In a model in which op-
timal reserve levels and their optimal composition are determined jointly, a rise in
reserves which is driven by precautionary motives leads to reserve portfolios with a
larger optimal share of the ￿safe asset￿ . An exogenous rise in reserves not explained
by precautionary motives leads to more reserve diversi￿cation, however.
In an empirical application, we show that the rise in reserves in our sample of
countries is mainly driven by "precautionary motives￿ , measured by capital account
openness, the imports-to-GDP ratio and exchange rate anchoring. Taken together,
these factors explain more than 50% of the variation in reserve holdings. Therefore,
it is reasonable that the rise in reserves in these countries was associated with larger
allocations to the ￿safe asset￿ . A regression of the portfolio share of the safe asset
on the residual part of the reserve increase provides some evidence for the notion
that an exogenous rise in reserves - i.e. one that is not driven by precautionary
motives - leads to more reserve diversi￿cation. The emergence of sovereign wealth
funds which have been created to manage ￿excess reserves￿to achieve higher returns
appears to be consistent with this reasoning.6
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1 Introduction
The notable increase in international reserve holdings over the past decade and their
use during the global ￿nancial crisis of 2008/2009 has sparked renewed interest in
the analysis of the optimal level of reserve holdings, in particular in countries which
are subject to sudden stops of capital in￿ ows. At the same time, a separate strand of
the literature attempts to determine the optimal currency composition of emerging
market central banks￿reserve portfolios which are mostly invested in low-yielding
dollar-denominated assets. While the general presumption has been that a rise in
reserve levels leads to more reserve diversi￿cation, no rigorous attempt has been
made to study possible mechanisms behind such a relationship. One exception is a
recent paper by Beck and Rahbari (2008) where an exogenous rise in reserves can
lead to reserve diversi￿cation. However, in this model, the level of reserves may not
be optimal and nothing can be said about the various drivers of the rise in reserves
which may have a di⁄erent impact on optimal reserve portfolios. For example, a rise
in reserve levels which is driven by a rise in risk aversion of the central bank could
impact optimal reserve portfolios in a di⁄erent way than an exogenous increase in
reserves levels.
In this paper, we show that when determining optimal reserve levels and optimal
reserve portfolio shares jointly, our understanding for the circumstances under which
increased reserve holdings go along with more reserve diversi￿cation improves con-
siderably. The basic mechanism behind our results is rather simple: higher reserve
holdings lower the probability of a crisis. Therefore, as the central bank increases its
reserve holdings, the expected additional cost of having to intervene potentially in a
currency which is not the anchor currency is relatively small compared to the gains
of diversi￿cation, since this cost is only paid in the advent of a crisis whereas diver-
si￿cation gains are made in all other circumstances. Hence, an exogenous increase
in reserves triggers in our model indeed increased reserve diversi￿cation. However,
if reserve increases are driven by higher risk aversion our results suggests that more
diversi￿cation may not materialize. We also show that the cost associated with the
holding of reserves is mainly driven by the level of reserves and only marginally
a⁄ected by their composition favoring precautionary motives over diversi￿cation in-
centives. However, in some particular cases gains from diversi￿cation are becoming
potentially important.
In an empirical part we draw on a sample of 20 countries which disclose the
currency composition of reserves to analyze to which extent the reserve composition
is altered by di⁄erent motives for the accumulation of reserves, in particular the
precautionary aspects. We ￿nd consistently that to the extent that reserve accumu-
lation is driven by precautionary motives, the share of the safe asset in total reserves
tends to increase.1 This is true for both the dollar and the euro share and countries
that anchor to the euro and those that anchor to the US dollar. However, results
regarding the reserve accumulation which is unrelated to precautionary motives are
less strong. For countries that anchor to the US there is evidence that higher reserves
1For the purpose of this paper a ￿ safe asset￿is an asset which can be used for intervention at a
lower ￿ hair-cut￿cost in times of a crisis in comparison with ￿ alternative￿assets.7
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do in fact lead to a higher weight of the alternative asset in the reserve composition.
Countries which anchor to the euro zone do show no signi￿cant link between the
reserve fraction unrelated to precautionary motives and the currency allocation of
the reserves.
The paper starts out with a brief overview of the literature on international
reserves. Section three outlines our theoretical framework. Simulation results for
the reserve level and composition and the associated costs of the holdings are pre-
sented in section four. Section ￿ve consists of the empirical analysis and section six
concludes.
2 The Literature
The literature on international reserves has a relatively long tradition and has tra-
ditionally been subdivided into two main ￿elds.2 The ￿rst, more prominent part,
focuses on the optimal level of international reserves. The second, less studied, part
centers around the optimal currency composition of international reserves.
Turning ￿rst to the literature on optimal reserve levels, we may again broadly
subdivide this literature into four strands according to the underlying motives for
reserve accumulation: 1) Inventory-Based 2) Crisis Mitigation and 3) Crisis Pre-
vention. Inventory-based models have the longest tradition with various contribu-
tions in the 1960s and early 1970s, including the work by Heller (1966) and Olivera
(1969). According to the ￿ndings of these studies the optimal reserve level is gen-
erally increasing in the size and variance of the reserve need (arising from balance
of payment disequilibria) and decreasing in the propensity to import 3 and the op-
portunity cost.4 Frenkel and Jovanovic (1981) synthesize these early contributions
later on, combining the opportunity cost considerations and the stochastic nature
of reserve needs using a transaction motive in the spirit of the Baumol-Tobin model
(Baumol, 1952; Tobin, 1956). They ￿nd empirical evidence to be remarkably in
line with the predictions of their model not only in terms of sign but also magni-
tude of the coe¢ cients.5 The literature on currency and balance of payment crises
2A third ￿eld, which is of less relevance from a country￿ s point of view (unless it aspires to become
a reserve currency country) takes a global stance and is concerned with the characteristics which
allow a currency to emerge as an international reserve currency. This literature builds primarily
on the potential reserve currencies characteristics (like share in world GDP, ￿nancial depth etc.)
and on network externalities coined by the early contributions of Swoboda (1968) and Krugman
(1984). Recent contributions include Matsuyama et al. (1993) and Eichengreen (1998) who uses
these insight for an empirical analysis of the (world) aggregate composition of reserve currencies.
Its primary relevance is within the ￿elds of trade invoicing (Goldberg and Tille, 2008) and the
choice of anchor currencies (Meissner and Oomes, 2006) but is also present in the literature on the
reserve currency choice as in Chinn and Frankel (2008).
3Frenkel (1974) showed later on that the sign with respect to the propensity to import may
also be positive. This is the case if it stands for the country￿ s openness and thus measures its
vulnerability to external shocks
4Oliviera (1969) already introduced a notion of a "coe¢ cient of security" which raised the level
of reserves and Heller (1966) noted that his analysis neglected the aspect of con￿dence in the
countries currency and the role reserve holdings may play in a⁄ecting the con￿dence. Hamada and
Ueda (1977) quali￿ed the original formula by Heller later on in an extension.
5Flood and Marion (2002) con￿rm the authors￿￿ndings based on more recent data, however,8
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advanced by Krugman (1979) has also attached a central role to the reserve level.
If the government runs a policy which is inconsistent with the country￿ s exchange
rate regime, reserves are depleted and an exchange rate peg needs to be abandoned.
While a higher reserve level postpones the crisis it can not prevent them in these
models. Against the backdrop of an increase in ￿nancial cross-border ￿ ows, more
emphasis has recently been put on the role of capital ￿ ows in triggering crises and
hence the role of reserves in mitigating and preventing so-called sudden stops. For
example, Ben-Bassat and Gottlieb (1992) formalize the link between the risk of re-
serve depletion and the default on the external debt. However, the authors derive no
closed form solution but rather a framework for estimating jointly default risk and
the implied optimal level of reserves. This strand was followed by the second gener-
ation models which focused on the self-ful￿lling crises aspect (Obstfeld, 1986, 1996;
Morris and Shin, 1998). Here reserves can be understood as re￿ ecting fundamentals
or as in Obstfeld (1996) the commitment level to defend the peg. If reserves are
high enough the joint sale of domestic currency of all foreign exchange traders is not
su¢ cient to lead to a break of the peg. Speculating that the peg will be abandoned
is thus an unpro￿table strategy. If instead reserves (commitment) are low (is weak)
sales can cause the authorities to abandon the peg. The motivation for precaution-
ary reserve holdings is therefore, ￿rmly anchored in second generation models. The
relevance of reserves for preventing crisis has been con￿rmed by empirical studies
(e.g. Bussiere and Mulder (1999)). Variants and extension of the role of reserves
in crisis mitigation have been developed in the following years with the most recent
proponents including Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Jeanne and RanciŁre (2008).
Based on a consumption smoothening approach, Jeanne and RanciŁre (2008)
derive a simple formula for the optimal reserve level.6 Using calibrations they con-
clude that apart from the post 2004 period their approach can account for most of
the change in reserve levels. This stream has been supplemented by a very recent
contribution of Obstfeld et al. (2008) which focus on sudden ￿ ights, characterized
by periods where not only foreign money leaves the country but emphasizing the
potential for the entire M2 to ￿ ee the country in a period of severe crisis. Caballero
and Panageas (2004) added an interesting extension to the mitigation literature by
emphasizing the role hedging can play. They argue that consumption smoothening
can be obtained via the choice of instruments that behave ￿counter-cyclical￿to sud-
den stops and pay higher returns in those times, essentially limiting the required
reserve level and thereby reducing the cost of reserve holdings signi￿cantly.
A rather small part of the literature focuses on the prevention e⁄ect of reserves.
However, it has been recognized already in the early literature that the probability
of balance of payment ￿nancing needs is not independent of the reserve level as
in Clark (1970) who derives jointly the optimal level of reserves and the speed of
argue that the measures lead to biased estimates. Re-estimating the regression with a di⁄erent
volatility measure (and ￿xed e⁄ects) leads them to conclude that despite the signi￿cance of the
variation measure the model explains rather little of the cross-country variation and the coe¢ cient
on the opportunity cost is relatively instable.
6More recently Carroll and Jeanne (2009) apply the precautionary motive to individual agents￿
choice over foreign asset holdings, explaining the "upstream￿￿ ows of capital from developing coun-
tries to advanced countries, and the long-run impact of global ￿nancial imbalances.9
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adjustment to external disequilibria. In the wake of the Mexican and the Asian crisis
the interest in liquidity for crisis prevention re-emerged in various articles, although
not necessarily being the center of analysis and linked to optimal level considerations
(see for instance Chang and Velasco (1999), Bussiere and Mulder (1999) and Jeanne
and Wyplosz (2001)). In a recent contribution, Garcia and Soto (2004) empirically
determine the optimal level of reserves based on an insurance policy approach and
￿nd that reserves strongly impact the risk of a crisis.
Finally, Dooley et al. (2004) have advanced the notion that the recent rise in
reserve levels is unrelated to any direct decisions on the appropriateness of the
reserve level, but is a side product of maintaining competitive exports. According
to this interpretation which has been put forward mainly with reference to the case
of China, the recent rise in reserve levels is a result of an in￿ exible exchange rate
regime aimed at promoting export-led growth through an undervalued exchange
rate. Aizenman and Lee (2007) test the importance of this ￿Mercantilist￿motive
versus the importance of the precautionary motive for accumulating reserves. The
authors show that though being statistically relevant, the Mercantilist argument is
dominated economically by the precautionary accumulation motive, rationalizing
the latter in a Diamond-Dybvig style liquidity shock model.
The literature on the composition of international reserves has been less visible
since data on the currency composition of reserves at the country-level is in most
cases con￿dential, making an empirical analysis di¢ cult. Nevertheless, there are
two main approaches that have been considered: First, under the assumption that
central banks pursue similar objectives as private investors, portfolio optimization
models have been used to explain the currency composition of foreign exchange re-
serves. Second, ￿transaction￿needs of central banks, i.e. temporary import ￿nanc-
ing, foreign exchange interventions or the smoothing of capital out￿ ows have been
considered as a possible explanations of the composition of reserve portfolios. With
respect to portfolio optimization Ben-Bassat (1980) suggests applying mean-variance
optimization in terms of a basket of import currencies. When comparing optimal to
actual reserve portfolios using data for 1976 and 1980, he ￿nds some evidence for
portfolio objectives as a determinant of the currency composition of reserves of the
emerging markets but not for industrialized countries. Dellas and Bang Yoo (1991)
use currency composition and import currency data for South Korea and ￿nd that
the mean-variance approach fares relatively well in explaining at least the share of
the main currency, the US Dollar. Heller and Knight (1978), on the other hand, ￿nd
support for the transaction motives relating to the exchange rate regime and the
trading partners which play the major role for the currency composition. Dooley et
al. (1989), hereafter DLM, use the entire country-level COFER data for an empirical
exercise to analyze the determinants of the currency composition, which has been
updated and supplemented more recently by Mathieson and Eichengreen (2000).
The recent study con￿rms former ￿ndings that the main determinants are the dom-
inant trading partners the choice of the currency peg and the currency composition
of foreign debt. DLM (1989) argue that it is worthwhile to distinguish net (of foreign
liabilities) and gross reserves. While the former seem to be governed by risk-return
considerations as in the mean-variance framework the latter tend to be a⁄ected by10
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a country￿ s exchange rate regime and the currency composition of foreign debt and
trade, making transaction motives more relevant. Despite its intuitive appeal it has
been argued that this classi￿cation is not without problems, since the line between
gross and net becomes blurred when M2 is considered as being potentially a liabil-
ity that need to be entirely converted into foreign reserves. In addition, institutions
which set the liability level (the government via the ￿nance ministry) are not directly
linked to those which set the asset composition and the level of foreign exchange
reserves (central bank). And lastly transaction costs, measured in the traditional
ask-bid spread, despite their empirical relevance pose no clear theoretical constraint
since they tend to be small in most currency markets. More recently, Chinn and
Frankel (2008) use the ￿ndings of the literature on transaction motives, portfolio
choice and the international currency determinants7 to show that using aggregate
data, currency shares are dominated by the size of the home country, the "con￿-
dence" in a currency and return considerations. They also ￿nd some support for
network externalities leading to slow adjustment and higher liquidity favoring one
over another currency. Papaioannou et al. (2006) develop a dynamic mean-variance
framework and compute the optimal reserves (under some constraints) for several
countries. Di⁄erent to Chinn and Frankel they conclude that the Euro is likely to be
already over represented from a mean-variance optimal point of view. Finally, Beck
and Rahbari (2008) compute the optimal euro and dollar shares for 24 emerging
market countries in the context of a minimum variance framework that incorporates
transaction needs arising due to sudden stops. When the reference currency of the
central bank is the local currency, central bank portfolios tend to be dominated
by a country￿ s anchor currency (and the implied low volatility against assets de-
nominated in these currencies) while the currency denomination of foreign debt has
little bearing for the portfolio decision. Furthermore, do the authors conclude that
dollar reserves tend to hedge better against regional sudden stops in Asia and Latin
America while the Euro is preferable in emerging markets in Europe.8 While their
framework includes no decision rule for the level of reserves, an exogenous increase
in reserves leads to a decline of transaction motives and more diversi￿cation towards
the minimum variance portfolio.
Most of the literature on reserves has treated the optimal level of reserves and
their allocation as two independent decisions.9 While this may be true for the
optimal reserve level (and in fact is so in our model for a limiting case) this is
clearly not true for the allocation of reserves.10 While the literature has generally
7See footnote (2) for references to this literature.
8Recently, Wong (2007) and Lim (2006) have looked at the role of exchange rate movements
for the composition of reserves, ￿nding that central banks behave in a balancing manner (buying
reserves when prices are low).
9Caballero and Panageas (2004), though focusing primarily on the hedging properties against a
sudden stop, are a notable exception. Dedola and Straub (2008) analyze the holdings of reserves
and their composition jointly in a three country model context, distinguishing between equity and
debt holdings. They ￿nd important consequences of di⁄erent foreign reserve allocation strategies
of the ￿nancially constrained country on the international asset allocations.
10Caballero and Panageas (2004) have demonstrated that the hedging property of certain assets
allows a lower reserve level. Hence, even the independence of the level from the allocation choice
is not necessarily a reasonable assumption.11
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accepted that there is a positive impact of the reserve level on the probability of a
crisis (Garc￿a and Soto, 2004; Jeanne and RanciŁre, 2008; Levy Yeyati, 2008) the
implications for the portfolio choice has been mostly ignored.
With the following we make an attempt to ￿ll this gap, which given the recent
hike in reserve levels and the accompanying controversy on reducing levels versus
allocating optimally seems an important analytical element that has not received
enough attention. We do so by emphasizing the role reserves play in crisis prevention.
We do not regard the alternative reasons for reserve holdings to be less relevant, but
rather prefer to focus on the element which we believe to build the strongest link
between the choice of the optimal level and composition of international reserves.
3 The Model Framework
Reserves are considered to serve three main functions: (1) they are a bu⁄er to ￿nance
any gap between private supply and demand for foreign exchange at a given exchange
rate (transaction motive), (2) a store of national wealth (mitigation motive) and
(3) a potential collateral or "sweetener" to attract and keep externally borrowed
funds at reasonable conditions (prevention motive). The decisions concerning the
level and the composition are independent only if these functions can be ful￿lled
independently (Horii, 1986). For this to be the case, markets need to be highly
liquid such that currencies can be converted at any time at zero cost and taking
on additional debt must be cost neutral to the advent of a crisis. The latter is
essentially ruled out by the nature of the de￿nition of a crisis. Furthermore, the
portfolio decision re￿ ects the optimal risk minimizing portfolio in the traditional
sense only if markets are su¢ ciently liquid, there are no ask-bid spreads which may
make cross-conversion more costly or the probability of the need to intervene is
essentially nil.
The model which we sketch in the next paragraph breaks with two traditions
in the literature. First and foremost we allow interaction between the level and the
composition. Second, we allow the composition to be deviating from the optimal
composition based on a standard variance minimizing approach. The deviation
is based on a "worst case" scenario consideration in which reserves need to be
liquidated and hence the property of the asset class in the worst case a⁄ects the
allocation. To keep things tractable we pay however the price of presenting a very
stylized approach, which neglects many of the aspects that have been shown to a⁄ect
the decisions in order to focus on the channels we like to highlight here. The essential
problem can be described with two reduced form equalities. The ￿rst guarantees the
optimal level of reserves, the second the optimal allocation across a given number
of assets. Under most circumstances these decisions will not be independent from
each other. The authority chooses optimally level and composition based on a mix
of standard variance minimizing approach and "worst case scenario" dimension by
maximizing the net bene￿ts from holding reserves. For the remainder of the paper
we will make use of the terms market portfolio and minimum variance portfolio
interchangeable.12
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3.1 The Economic Environment
To highlight the origin of the costs and bene￿ts of reserves we ￿rst sketch the
stylized economy before turning to the authorities optimization problem. Consider
an economy with an exogenous level of output Y . There is no private saving such
that the representative consumer￿ s consumption level is given in times of tranquility
by
CT
t = Y ￿ Zt
where Zt is a transfer to the authorities. The transfer is given by the amount the
government needs to maintain its wished level of reserves Rt. To maintain the reserve
level the government needs to pay a fee for the management of its reserves (￿￿) which
insures the authority against ￿ uctuation in returns in tranquil times. Additionally,
the government pays a premium g to raise the new reserves which corresponds to
the return it could have made by investing in the local economy rather than holding
foreign assets.11 The government inherits the reserves from last period (Rt￿1) plus
the return on the holdings (
P
￿iriRt￿1) where ￿i is the share in the respective asset
and ri is the return on asset i given by ri = 1+i
1+￿ (1 + ￿ei)￿1. The transfer in times
of tranquility is then given by:12






Using the transfer rule in the de￿nition of consumption gives:
CT





Rt￿1 ￿ (1 + g)￿Rt ￿ ￿￿
We assume that there is a unique optimal pre-crisis level of reserves which is stable,
such that ￿Rt = 0.13 The cost of holding reserves in such a context is given by the





which is assumed to be positive
in line with empirical evidence (see Rodrik (2006)). Hence, pre-crisis consumption
will always be given by:
CT





Rt￿1 ￿ ￿￿ (1)
In times of a crisis no reserves are levied and no returns from the investment are
received but instead transaction costs may have to be paid due to the premature
liquidation. A crisis is de￿ned as a period in which output drops by a fraction ￿
below its tranquil time￿ s value as in Jeanne and Ranciere (2008). Consumption in
crisis times is hence given by:
CC
t = (1 ￿ ￿)Y + R￿
t (2)
11Alternatively, this could be interpreted as the implicit cost of issuing long term bonds to ￿nance
the reserve stock (Jeanne and Ranciere, 2008).
12A foundation based on a trade -o⁄ between long term and short term debt for such a set up is
given by Jeanne and Ranciere (2008).
13Note that in our context Y is given and does not grow over time such that the R=Y ￿ratio is
assumed to be stable.13
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1193
May 2010
where R￿











where ti is the "haircut" cum transaction cost of asset i above a reference level
t￿. We assume
P
ti = 0 such that the term ti can be positive for some assets and
negative for others. If ti is positive then it is a better hedge against the sudden stop
then the alternative assets.
3.2 The Management Fee
One way to determine the extent of the fee is given by the notion that the reserve
manager is to some extent risk averse. The fee is hence equivalent to the compensa-
tion needed to induce the manager to take on the risk of holding the portfolio and
insure the authority against ￿ uctuations in its value in tranquil times. We assume
that the reserve management fund is not able to insure against the sudden stop but
only against "standard" ￿ uctuations in tranquil times and therefore simply cares
about the utility derived from the standard portfolio.14 In sudden stop periods the
insurer simply transfers to the authorities the current value of the reserve holdings
(R￿
t). The risk premium for the authority￿ s portfolio is then given by:
E [u(X)] = u(E (X) ￿ ￿￿)
where u(X) is the utility of the manager associated with the wealth X, which is
the gross return on the portfolio
X =
X
￿i (1 + ri)R
We assume for simplicity equal expected returns and a utility function of the CRRA
type with risk aversion parameter ￿P. In such a context, it can be shown that an








i = ri ￿ E (ri). Hence, the management fee is linearly
increasing in the level of reserves, the variance of the portfolio and the risk aversion
of the reserve manager.
3.3 The Optimization Problem
We let the authorities maximize the net bene￿ts from holding reserves, by maximiz-



















14The assumption seems in line with recent experience of several reserve funds which experienced
big losses from their management strategies while there has been a strong drain on the reserve
levels.
15For details see the Appendix.14
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1￿￿(R) is the probability that a crisis occurs and is assumed to be decreasing in the
reserves. For h(￿G) = 1 the policy maker would weight each period the same, i.e.
a loss in crisis times is equivalent to a loss in times of tranquility. However, it may
be reasonable to presume that h(￿G) > 1 which is akin of overweighting the worst
case scenario. A motivation may be seen in the idea that bad performance in the
crisis period is much more costly for the authority than bad management of reserves
during tranquil times. Additionally, we allow the risk aversion (￿G) to a⁄ect the
trade-o⁄ between return and cost of insurance, by decreasing the weight on the cost
of insurance with a higher degree of the authority￿ s risk aversion.16 The level of
reserves is determined by setting the marginal cost of holding reserves equal to the
marginal bene￿t from holding them, which is given by the ￿rst order condition with













































From a partial equilibrium perspective (i.e. assuming
@￿
@￿(R) = @￿i
@￿(R) = 0) this
equality implies for our assumption of ￿0
R (R) > 0 that a higher degree of the
authorities level of risk aversion (￿G) leads to a higher reserve level given the natural
assumption that h0
￿G (￿) > 0. An increase in the opportunity cost (g￿
P
￿iri) leads
to a reduction in the reserves as does an increase in the general transaction cost
(t￿). An increase in the risk aversion of the international investor relative to the
authority (￿P
￿G) leads to a lower reserve level. It is worth noting that in this simpli￿ed
functional form "￿;R governs the entire shape of the probability, the implications of
which are described in more detail in the Appendix.17
16This is not essential, seems however realistic since a very risk averse government is likely to
accept a higher fee to insure against ￿ uctuations.
17Levy-Yeyati (2006) found no signi￿cant impact of reserves on the elasticity itself using spreads
as dependent variable, which should re￿ ect the crisis probability. To arrive at a simple solution we
use this ￿nding and make the assumption that the elasticity of the crisis probability is independent
of the level of reserves. Under
@"￿;R
@R = 0 we may postulate ￿(R) =
￿ R
Y





















If we were to abstract from the portfolio considerations, the optimal reserve level in such a
scenario is entirely linked to the elasticity, the opportunity cost and the risk aversion and may be
determined by the single equation
R
Y
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The ￿rst order condition pinning down the optimal shares is determined by

























[1 + E (r)]
Using matrix notation the optimal share condition is given by












￿i = 1. ￿ is the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix and T is the vector
of transaction costs and A the vector of asset shares.
3.4 Composition and Level of Reserves in the Two Asset Case
In general (4), (5) and
P
￿i = 1 can be used to pin down the implied shares and
reserve level in the multiple asset case. To gain a better understanding for the
mechanisms, we will work however with the two asset case. Fixing the amount of
assets under consideration to two implies the identity ￿1 + ￿2 = 1 and t1 = ￿t2.









i stands for the (standard variance-minimizing) optimal market portfolio of a
risk averse agent and ￿ is a positive coe¢ cient.19 In the presence of transaction costs,
the extent of the deviation of the authority￿ s portfolio from the market portfolio is
in￿ uenced by the relative risk aversion (￿G
￿P ) and the "subjective probability" of a
crisis (
[1￿￿(R)]h(￿G)
￿(R) ). A reduced crisis probability drives the portfolio closer to the
optimal market portfolio as does a lower importance attached to the consumption
level in the crisis period. In fact for the extreme case of zero probability of a crisis
the portfolio is equal to a private agent￿ s portfolio. Higher transaction cost tend
to drive the authority away from the optimal market portfolio. An increase in the
relative risk aversion of the authority does alike. Combining these with the ￿rst
We may allow a more general form of the probability which may be described by































2). And the coe¢ cient is
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order condition with respect to reserves, yields a quadratic equation for the ratio
X =
[1￿￿(R)]
￿(R) . The solution to this quadratic formula is given in the Appendix and
used for depicting the following calibrations.
4 The Baseline Calibration
Even though the model yields a closed form solution (see Appendix), many analytical
results depend on parameter values. However, for reasonable parameter values,
results are unambiguous. For the opportunity cost we have independently of the
parameters that @R
@g < 0 which leads directly to @￿
@g < 0, where ￿ is taken to be
a costly asset in the sense that its return exhibits a higher volatility than the safe
asset and it has a higher transaction cost in periods of a crisis. One way to think
about this asset is in the context of an exchange rate peg to the dollar, where ￿
could stand for the share of euro denominated reserves.
In the following we present how the optimal reserve ratio, the probability of no
crisis and the share invested in the costly asset varies with the various parameters
of the model. For the baseline case we assume the authorities to be twice as risk
averse as the international investor taking on the values: ￿G = 4, ￿P = 2. In line
with real returns on low risk government bonds we take the expected yearly return
on the two assets to be E (r1) = E (r2) = 0:02. The premium g is taken to be 6%
such that the resulting opportunity cost from holding reserves is given by 4% in line
with average estimates (See Rodrik 2006). The functional form for the probability
is given by the most simple case (￿(R=Y ) = (R=Y )
"￿;R) and the elasticity is taken
to be "￿;R = 0:02 such that a reserve ratio of 5% implies a crisis roughly every 20
years and a ratio of 30% a crisis every 50 years. We set h =
p
￿G such that in the
baseline case the crisis period is weighted double relative to a period of tranquility
and an increase leads to a higher weight of crisis periods though at a diminishing
rate. We assume a haircut cum transaction cost of 2% for the costly asset. While
this is well above the standard bid-ask spread which is unlikely to be anywhere close
to a percentage point even for developing countries￿currencies, it is not very high if
we take into account that the cost is incurred under ￿nancial stress and represents to
some extent the hedging property of the respective asset. It implies that on average
the "safe" asset pays 2% higher return than the average return on the portfolio under
￿nancial stress. Hence we assume the "safe" asset to hedge better against a sudden
stop then the costly asset. Finally, the properties of the assets are described by the
annual standard deviation of the save asset with 10%, the costly asset with 14%
such that the variance of asset one is half the variance of asset two. The correlation
between the two assets is taken to be negative to have a clear gain from diversifying,
where the correlation is taken to be ￿0:35 (implying a covariance of ￿0:005). The
latter three speci￿cations imply that the market portfolio is given by a 62.5% to
37.5% split between the save and alternative asset.17
ECB
Working Paper Series No 1193
May 2010
4.1 An Exogenous Increase in Reserves
Let us ￿rst consider how the optimal composition changes if we exogenously change
the level of reserves from close to zero to 40% of GDP.










Probability of no Crisis








Share in Costly Asset
Not surprisingly, the chosen optimal portfolio for the authority￿ s preferences
gets closer to the market portfolio the higher the reserve ratio. The reason for this
is in the declined crisis probability, which is implied by the higher reserve ratio.
This mechanism is essentially what several observers regard as the argument for the
need to increased diversi￿cation given the current (perceived) high levels of reserves.
However, as the next experiment will show, observing a higher level of reserves per
se does not imply that a move towards the market portfolio is necessarily optimal.
4.2 A Rise in the Government￿ s Risk Aversion
Consider an increase in the risk aversion of the authority. The increased risk aversion
has the e⁄ect that (1) authorities are more concerned about crisis periods relative
to tranquil times and (2) value less the cost from increased insurance against ￿ uc-
tuations relative to the opportunity cost (Or put di⁄erently: tolerate a higher cost
associated with varying returns for a given loss due to the opportunity costs). Both
the channels lead to an increase in the reserve level and a move away from the mar-
ket portfolio. However, their contribution is di⁄erent. The increased weight on the
crisis period leads to an increase in reserves to avoid crisis periods. This has via the
falling probability of a crisis the e⁄ect that the authorities tend to move closer to
the market portfolio as with an exogenous increase in reserves. However, the higher
weight that is put on the loss in crisis periods outweighs this e⁄ect and makes the
safe asset relatively more attractive.20 The second e⁄ect of an increase in the risk
aversion, leads primarily to a shift away from the market portfolio and increases
marginally the reserve ratio.21 The move away from the market portfolio is a result
of the fact that the authority cares less about the cost of insurance, allowing her
20Recall that we set h =
p
￿G. Using higher powers reinforces the latter e⁄ect.
21Generally the latter e⁄ect is below 1 percentage point.18
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to put more emphasis on the transaction motives, as can be seen in the reduced
form solution (6). Similarly the lower perceived cost from reserve holdings (as of
the lower insurance cost) allows an increase in the reserve level to equalize marginal
costs to marginal bene￿ts.22 The combined e⁄ect is presented in the graph below
by moving the degree of risk aversion form half the international investor￿ s level to
5 times the international investors risk aversion.
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4.3 A Change in the Elasticity of the Crisis Probability to Reserves
Next we consider a change in the shape parameter of the crisis probability. In this
reduced form the parameter "￿;R governs the entire probability. An increase makes
the probability of no crisis more sensitive to an increase in reserves, implies however
22Mathematically, it is worth noting that using (6) in ￿,
P
￿iri and (1 ￿ Ti￿i) of (4) and taking










￿G￿(￿G) + g ￿ E (r)
i
￿









@R > 0 and
@￿(￿G)
@￿G > 0 it follows that
@R
@￿G > 0 i⁄
@￿(￿G)
@￿G is outweighed by the two other
e⁄ects trough which ￿G enters independently and in a increasing manner the reserve ratio. In plain
terms: The reserve level will increase as long as the increased variance of the portfolio due to a move






and the increase expected bene￿t of reserves due to the lower expected transaction costs
in terms of crisis (as of the move to the safer asset).19
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also that for a given level of reserves the probability of no crisis is lower.23 This may
be synonymous for countries which are well developed and have a very low crisis
probability independent of the level of reserves, at one extreme. And at the other
extreme, countries which have a high "exogenous" crisis probability, but can steer
con￿dence in their economy via increasing reserves.24 Again we ￿nd that despite an
observed increase in the reserves the optimality conditions imply a move away from
the market portfolio.
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As the shape parameter increases the probability of a crisis for a given level
of reserves becomes more likely. However, at the same time do we have that an
increase in the parameter increases the marginal e⁄ect of the reserves on the crisis
probability, creating a gap between expected costs and now higher expected bene￿ts
of reserves. This gap is closed by increasing the reserve level, which dampens the
fall in the probability of no crisis. Overall the probability of a crisis will still increase
making transaction motives more relevant and thereby shifting the allocation away
form the market portfolio.25
23This dichotomy can be broken by assuming the more general form. See the Appendix for
details. However, some of the ￿ndings in the literature indicate the possibility of such an e⁄ect
(Garcia and Soto 2004).
24In terms of the literature on self-ful￿lling crisis the former countries are essentially in the zone
were fundamentals are so strong that a crisis is not to be expected, making the reserves￿e⁄ect on
the crisis close to nil and those countries with intermediate fundamentals which may avoid the crisis
only by increasing reserves.
25If only the ￿rst e⁄ect would be present (i.e. an increase in the crisis probability without a⁄ecting
the marginal e⁄ect of reserves) we would observe an increase in the reserve ratio and a move away
from the market portfolio. If only the latter e⁄ect is present, we would see a fall in the reserve ratio
(a fall in the crisis probability) and a move toward the market portfolio.20
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4.4 A Change in the Transaction Cost
Finally, we look at the impact of the transaction cost. This may be seen in two ways.
First there is t￿ which applies generally. Second, we may vary t2 which is essentially
re￿ ecting the relative hedging properties in sudden stops of asset 2 relative to asset
1 and the di⁄erence in the transaction cost of the two. From (6) we immediately
see that there is no direct impact of t￿ on the portfolio split. (4) implies together
with
@￿
@R > 0, that @R
@t￿ < 0, i.e. the reserve level falls with a general increase in the
transaction cost (from 13% to 10% for a move from 2% to 20%!).
This is intuitive since a higher t￿ implies a lower level of reserves available for
intervention in crisis times, reducing the marginal bene￿t of reserve holdings.26 This
in turn leads via the increased crisis probability to a move to the asset which pays
more in crisis times reinforcing the transaction motives. The latter e⁄ect is very low
since the reserve level is only moderately a⁄ected by t￿. Not surprisingly, the e⁄ect of
an increase in t2 has more pronounced e⁄ects on the portfolio. Increasing t2 (worse
hedging properties of asset 2) directly moves the portfolio away from the market
portfolio as is easily seen in (6). The impact on the reserve level is ambiguous,
however tends to be positive, for reasonable parameters. In our baseline scenario it
leads to an increase of the reserve level by less then one percentage point.
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The graph depicts an increase of t2 from 1 to 10 %. As mentioned, reserves
are essentially una⁄ected, while the portfolio moves from the market portfolio to
a portfolio which consists entirely of the safe asset, with the improved hedging
properties.
26This e⁄ect is di⁄erent to the idea in Caballero and Pangeas (2006), who show that reserves may
even be reduced by several percentage points if the hedging properties of the portfolio is improved.
The two ￿ndings can be reconciled. A lower level of t￿ implies better hedging properties of the
portfolio against sudden stops. According to Caballero and Pangeas this should lead to a reduction
in the reserves. In our framework it leads to an increase since the marginal bene￿ts from reserve
holdings have increased while the costs have remained unchanged. However, the reserves available
for intervention R
￿ increase by more than the level of reserves R. Hence, if the authority aims at
a given level of reserves for intervention R
￿ (as is the case in the mitigation literature) this could
be done with a lower level of actual reserve holdings R when t￿ falls, reducing the pre-crisis level
of reserves.21
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Our results have shown that ceteris paribus an increase in the reserve level should
lead via a reduction in the probability of a crisis to a move towards the (diversi￿ed)
market portfolio. However, this is conditional on the underlying parameters. A
reserve increase which is rooted in an increased risk aversion or the believe that the
crisis probability has increased is more likely to be associated with a move away from
the market portfolio since transaction motives become more important in guiding
the authorities investment decisions. To the extent that the recent build up in
reserves is rooted in precautionary motives, diversi￿cation should not be expected.
If, however, the accumulation is rooted in a more exogenous driver of reserves, like
mercantilist exchange rate policies, the associated reserve increase should go along
with a move towards the market portfolio.
4.5 The Cost of Reserves
The optimal level of reserves is inseparably linked to the cost of reserves.27 What are
the costs associated with the reserve levels and the optimal composition implied by
our calibration? The monetary cost of reserve holdings can be split into three com-
ponents: (1) the opportunity cost (g ￿
P
￿iri)R , (2) the insurance cost ￿(￿￿)￿PR
and (3) the cost of not diversifying [￿(￿) ￿ ￿(￿￿)]￿PR. While the ￿rst component
is standard in the literature which generally abstracts from portfolio decisions (i.e.
it takes usually the form (g ￿ r)R as it does here in expected terms), the second
and third components derive from the portfolio decision and deserve some attention.
(2) may be understood as a shadow cost that is implied by the fact that returns on
the assets are not constant but vary. An authority which dislikes varying returns
may buy the certainty equivalence which is either feasible via forward operations
or outsourcing the portfolio management and paying a fee in return for a certain
return. Both of which is common today. Finally (3), represents the notion that
the authority asks a di⁄erent portfolio allocation (i.e. gives a benchmark to the
external investor) than the one an international investor would choose, since it is
also concerned with liquidity needs. To hold this portfolio an extra cost is charged,
since it is not the optimal portfolio from a mean variance point of view in tranquil
times. Depending on the particular parameters the implied cost of reserve holdings
varies between 0.2 and 1.2% of GDP in our baseline calibration.28
27Recent estimates may be found in Rodrik (2006)
28Our calibrations yield costs which are consistent with recent estimates by Rodrik (2006). Ac-
cording to his estimates the cost of reserves for developing countries in 2004 are for a spread of 4%
around 0.7% of GDP. Since Rodrik uses the concept of "excess" reserves, i.e. above the 3-month
import coverage, and reserves are on average at 8-month coverage for this group in 2004 the value
which is comparable to our model is 1.12% (= 0:7￿
8
5). This value is obtained in our calibrations if
for instance ￿G = 6 and " = 0:04.22
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Compared to the opportunity cost, the cost from (optimally) deviating from the
market portfolio seems relatively small; it contributes never more than 10% to the
total cost and never exceeds 0.1 % of GDP per annum. Hence, at ￿rst sight there
is little incentive for a central bank to trade-o⁄ its transaction motive objectives
against a more return oriented approach.29 However, compared to the costs asso-
ciated with business cycle ￿ uctuations, it is not low in magnitude in particular for
29Note that with increasing risk aversion and a higher level of the shape parameter " the cost
associated with the deviation from the market portfolio increases. However, this cost has a natural
limit, i.e. when all assets are invested in the "safe" asset. Allowing expected returns across assets
to deviate may also add to the cost. This point has been made strongly be Caballero and Pangeas
(2006). Furthermore, it has been noted that the standard spread tends to overstate the cost of the
reserves since higher reserve holdings tend to reduce the cost of (private) foreign debt (Levy-Yeyati,
2006) a factor which has not been considered here.23
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higher levels of risk aversion.
5 Empirical Implementation
Our simple model shows that the decision about the optimal portfolio allocation is
dependent on the level of reserves. While an exogenous increase in the reserve ratio
pushes the portfolio towards more diversi￿cation since it reduces the probability of a
crisis and hence increases the expected gain from diversi￿cation, this is not generally
true if the reserves change endogenously. There is no simple one-for one relationship
between the level of reserves and the degree of diversi￿cation. In particular, an
increase in the degree of risk aversion of the authority generally leads to an increase
in the reserve ratio but is associated with a move into safe assets, away from the
optimally diversi￿ed market portfolio. Hence, to the extent that the recent reserve
accumulation is motivated by such considerations it is not at all clear why we should
see a move towards more diversi￿ed portfolios.
5.1 Data
Using a sample of 20 countries over di⁄erent periods in time we investigate to which
extent these predictions of the model are consistent with the data.30 With the
exception of the US, which has to be excluded from our analysis, the choice of
countries re￿ ects the fact that these are the only countries which make information
on their reserve composition publicly available. In comparison with the aggregate
allocation of reserves of all developing countries which communicate their individual
allocation on a con￿dential basis to the IMF (COFER data) our data set has a bias
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Average Euro Share in Reserve Holdings
In a preliminary step we check whether their is any link between the reserve ratio
and the currency shares of the 20 countries in our sample. Using local polynomial
regression of the currency shares on the reserve ratio (as depicted in the four graphs)
suggests that there is a clear positive link between the level of reserves and the
30For a detailed description of the data see the Appendix.24
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allocation of reserves into the safe asset. Countries which anchor to the euro tend
to increase the euro share as the level of reserves increases while other countries
tend to do the contrary. The results for the dollar share mirror this pattern, with
countries anchoring to the euro reducing their dollar holdings as the reserve ratio
increases. These ￿ndings are consistent with the predictions of the model to the
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5.2 Estimation
To analyze the link between reserve level and composition in more depth we estimate
a linear approximation of the relationship as set out by the theoretical framework.








An approximation of this rule is given by











i;t ￿ Ri;t + ￿3ti;t + ei;t (7)
where c = ￿
￿P , which is constant across i and assumed to be constant across
time.31 Dk
i;t is an indicator dummy which re￿ ects whether the country anchors to
31While the assumption of c being constant across i derives form the model for the 2-asset case
with an international investor, the constancy across time is reasonable for the short horizon we
consider. The use of a year ￿xed e⁄ects or a trend may capture possible changes.25
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the US (k = 1) or the Euro (k = 2) or is an independent ￿ oat. We choose the
￿ oat as the natural base category. Regarding the last term ti;t, we follow Dooley
et al (1989) and Eichengreen and Mathieson (2000) and use the import share in
the reserve currency as an independent proxy for transaction motives (debt in the
respective currency is only relevant for developing countries which would exclude
several of the countries in our sample). Since the impact of the share on the reserve
ratio (Ri;t) is of second order we consider reserves in this regression as exogenous.
However, the reserve level may be driven by various factors, which we divide for our
purpose into precautionary and other motives. Hence, a second equation is given by
Ri;t = ￿i + ￿1￿G;it + ￿2Xi;t + ui;t (8)
It is di¢ cult to exactly pin down which fraction of the reserve increase is due
to precautionary aspects and which part may be regarded as a more exogenous
increase. Our approach to the division is a pragmatic one in the sense that we
rely on the literature￿ s postulations. According to Aizenman and Lee (2007) reserve
accumulation is driven by precautionary motives if they are due to an increase in a
country￿ s capital account openness or the experience of severe (regional) economic
crises. Additionally, the authors divide between external motives (exchange rate
volatility and import to GDP ratio), domestic factors (population) and mercantilist
factors (undervaluation and export growth). Due to the restricted time frame of
our data set the use of crisis dummies is ill suited which leads us to drop this
dimension from the analysis. Instead we consider the capital account openness and
what Aizenman and Lee (2007) call external factors as causing an increase in the
risk aversion and a related increase in the reserve ratio. Hence, our measures for
￿G;it include the capital account openness as measured by the index of Chinn (2008),
the imports to GDP ratio as well as a dummy which takes the value unity if the
country is considered to anchor its currency￿ s value to the dollar or the euro. To
measure the exogenous part of the reserve increase we simply estimate
Ri;t = ￿i + ￿1￿G;it + ei;t (9)
and consider the part of reserves which can not be attributed to precautionary
motives as "exogenous".
REX
i;t = Ri;t ￿ ^ ￿1￿G;it = ei;t
The model predicts that an increase in reserves driven by ￿G;it should lead to
a move into the safe asset while the other changes should lead to the contrary.
Inserting, (8) in (7) results in our estimation equation:


















i;t and ￿2 = ￿k
2Dk
i;t. While an OLS estimation of this
relationship may provide a good approximation, the censored nature of the data,
being limited to values within the interval from 0 to 100%, makes a Tobit technique26
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preferable. Additionally, due to the presence of ￿￿
i it may be important to explicitly
take account of time invariant ￿xed e⁄ects.32 While there is no direct counterpart
as the ￿xed e⁄ect regressor in the OLS case, a procedure proposed by Chamberlain
(1984) and Mundlak (1978) provides an unbiased estimator under certain assump-
tions. The procedure requires to augment (10) by including the average value of
the regressors as additional controls.33 It turns out that in many of the regres-
sions the adjustment is not necessary and the traditional random e⁄ect Tobit model
is accurate, since the correction terms which are included under the Chamberlain
procedure turn out to be insigni￿cant.
5.3 Results
The ￿rst stage ￿xed e⁄ects regression (9) for the determinants of the reserve level
con￿rms the ￿ndings by Aizenman and Lee (2007) and Obstfeld et al (2008).34 Re-
serves are increasing in all the aspects which are meant to capture the precautionary
motives.35 An increase in the capital account openness index by one standard de-
viation increases the reserve ratio by 1.5 percentage points, while a one standard
deviation increase in the imports to GDP ratio increases reserve holdings by 4 per-
centage points. Being classi￿ed as anchoring to a foreign currency increases reserve
holdings by 9.6 percentage points compared to ￿ oats. The latter e⁄ect works partly
through increased imports. In fact when using import in % of GDP rather then
the orthogonal part of imports of GDP to the anchor dummy the coe¢ cient on the
anchor drops to 6.3. Together the precautionary factors explain more than 50% of
the variation in reserve holdings. The split between the fraction of reserve hold-
ings driven by precautionary motives as opposed to other factors is depicted in the
Appendix for each country.
32While it is not necessarily true that ￿
￿
i is time invariant, it is likely to be a good approximation
in our rather short sample.
33In particular, our model resembles an unobserved e⁄ects Tobit model which is characterized by
￿i;t = max(0;xi;t￿ + ￿i + "i;t) where "i;tjxi;￿i ￿ N(0;￿
2
"). The latter assumption can be relaxed





the variance of ui in ￿i =  +xi￿+ui. The random e⁄ects Tobit model with Chamberlain adjustment





u). See also Wooldrige (2002). Honore proposes an alternative semi-parametric
estimator which allows to drop the distributional assumption. See Honore (1992) and Honore and
Kyriazidou (2000).
34The estimation includes country ￿xed e⁄ects and the imports in % of GDP are the residuals
from an OLS regression of imports in % of GDP on the peg variable, since countries which peg
tend to have higher imports. While this leaves all other coe¢ cients una⁄ected, not controlling for
this aspect leads to underestimating the e⁄ect of the peg on the reserve level.
35Using a longer time period for the ￿rst stage regression than the one which is available for the
asset allocation data leaves signi￿cance una⁄ected but increases slightly the coe¢ cient values on
KAOPEN and Imports in % of GDP while reducing the impact of the anchor on reserves.27
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First Stage: Reserve Level
KAOPEN 1.10*** (0.39)
Imports (% of GDP) 0.26*** (0.06)
Anchor 9.65*** (1.83)
Constant 7.54*** (1.08)
Obs. (Countries) 171 (20)
R2(overall=within) 0.53 / 0.28
Standard errors in parenthesis
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Our focus is however on the second stage regression (10). We divide between the
regression for the US dollar share and the euro share. We ￿rst present the results
when using the aggregate measures from the ￿rst stage estimation as regressors.
Under this situation we impose all in￿ uence to be channeled via the reserve accu-
mulation and allow but for the traditional transaction motives as controls.36 The
regression is hence given by setting ￿2 = 0 and constraining coe¢ cients such that:37










i;t + ￿3ti;t + "i;t
= ￿EA
1 ￿G;it + ￿EA
2 REX
i;t + ￿US




i + ￿3ti;t + "i;t (11)
The following two tables provide an overview of the main speci￿cations.38 As a
reference, we provide in the ￿rst column the regression results based on the standard
transaction motive model. The statistics include the log likelihood and the adjusted
R2 value of an OLS counterpart to the respective estimation in order to compare
the models explanatory power. The F-statistic indicates whether the Chamberlain
adjustment terms are entering jointly signi￿cant in the regression or not.
36It turns out that this has no relevance, since any separately included precautionary variables
enter the regression insigni￿cant and leaves results una⁄ected. What however matters is that the
coe⁄eicents are constrained as will be shown in the second set of regressions.
37Note that the regression is synonymous for a constrained regression of the following type:
￿i;t = ￿
EA
1 ￿1KAOPENi;t + ￿
EA
































i;t = c + ￿
￿
i + ￿3ti;t + "i;t and the constraints are given by ￿1 = ￿
￿
1, ￿2 = ￿
￿
2 and ￿3 = ￿
￿
3.
38See the Appendix for some additional speci￿cations.28
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The traditional models (A1 and A5) do a fairly good job in explaining the
allocation of reserves. In fact only the two regressors (anchor and trade with the
anchor country) explain for both the US dollar and the euro share about 50% of
the overall variation. As theory predicts anchoring to the currency has a signi￿cant
positive impact on the holding of the respective currency in total reserve holdings.
The impact appears to be more pronounced for countries that use the dollar as an
anchor. Similarly increasing trade with the anchor country increases the share of
that country￿ s currency in total reserves. If we estimate the second stage regression
of the reserve augmented model (11) the ￿t improves markedly. For the euro share
the model explains close to 70% and for the dollar share 60% of the variation. In
all speci￿cations do we ￿nd the precautionary motive of reserve accumulation to be29
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associated with an increase in the share of the respective anchor currency, the safe
asset and a decrease in the alternative asset. Generally the e⁄ect appears to be
stronger for countries anchoring to the US dollar. The precautionary e⁄ect is robust
across speci￿cations and the two currencies. Additionally, we ￿nd evidence that the
exogenous part of reserve accumulation of countries anchoring to the US dollar is
invested in the alternative currency (euro) while diminishing the share invested in
the safe asset, the US dollar. The share of trade with the respective currency area
enters in all regressions signi￿cantly with the expected positive sign. Note that in all
regressions except for (A4) the adjustment terms from the Chamberlain procedure
enter jointly insigni￿cantly validating the traditional random e⁄ects Tobit approach.
Motivated by the promising results we go one step further and relax the as-
sumption that all adjustment comes via the reserve level and allow ￿G;it to have an
independent e⁄ect on the composition of reserves by estimating:
￿i;t = ￿EA
1 ￿1KAOPENi;t + ￿EA
















The following two table give an overview of the regression results from (11). Re-
gression (B1) and (B7) use the capital account openness measure of Chin and Ito as
the single measure of risk aversion. For the main speci￿cation, which includes a time
trend, it turns out that an increase in openness signi￿cantly increases the holdings
of the safe asset only for countries that anchor to the US. Excluding the time trend
renders all coe¢ cients signi￿cant except for the coe¢ cient on KAOPEN￿US in the
euro share regression (see Appendix B19 and C19). If we use instead the import to
GDP ratio as measure of risk aversion (B2) and (C2) we ￿nd the coe¢ cients to be
correctly signed and signi￿cant for both regressions, the euro share and the dollar
share in reserve holdings. While the exogenous part of the reserve accumulation is
correctly signed and signi￿cant for countries that anchor to the US when excluding
precautionary motives from the regression ((B3) and (B9)) and when adding the cap-
ital account openness as precautionary motives ((B4) and (B10)) adding the imports
as precautionary motive renders the coe¢ cients insigni￿cant ((B5) (B6) and (B11)
(B12)).30
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The results clearly support the idea that precautionary motives are dominant in
the allocation of reserve holdings while other motives appear to play a subordinate
role.39 Both capital account openness and dependence on imports are causing a move
to safer assets. The latter seems to be more relevant across all countries. While the
traditional approach for almost all regressions that use the euro share as dependent
variable seems appropriate when using the dollar share the F-test indicates in most
regressions that the Chamberlain procedure appears more appropriate. We report
the results in the Appendix to maintain the analysis in the main text homogeneous.
The results remain unaltered with one exception: the coe¢ cient on the trade with
the US turns insigni￿cant.
6 Conclusion
We present a simple model which links the decision of the reserve level and the
allocation of reserves across currencies. While factors that primarily a⁄ect the com-
position of the portfolio have negligible impacts on the reserve level the reverse is
not true. We show that it is unlikely that the cost of reserve accumulation can be
reduced signi￿cantly by moving to more diversi￿ed portfolios unless authorities are
willing to take on much higher risks (associated with higher returns). This in turn is
only likely if the reserve accumulation is driven by factors other than precautionary
motives. Hence, it depends on the factors that stand behind the increase in reserves
whether increased diversi￿cation is optimal or not. For a sample of 20 countries
we ￿nd that precautionary motives are not only the major driver behind reserve
accumulation but they are also re￿ ected in the allocation of the assets dominat-
ing over return motives. While we ￿nd primarily evidence of the allocation being
a function of precautionary motives, we also ￿nd some weak evidence for reserve
accumulation to lead to more diversi￿ed portfolios if reserve accumulation is driven
by other factors than precautionary motives.
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A List of Symbols
Variable Description
Y Output
CT;CC Consumption in tranquil and crisis times
Z Lump sum transfer
R Total Reserves
R￿ Reserves available for intervention
1 ￿ ￿(R) Probability of a crisis
￿i Share of reserves held in asset i
￿￿
i Share of reserves in asset i under the market portfolio
￿￿ Total fee paid to reserve manager for managing R
￿ Fee per unit of reserves held
ri Return on asset i
r￿
i ri￿E (ri)
g Premium paid to raise reserves
￿ Fraction of output lost in crisis period
ti Transaction cost associated with asset i
￿G;￿P Risk aversion of the government and the reserve manager





￿(R) R : Elasticity of no crisis prob. w.r.t. reserves
B The Crisis Probability
The graph below depicts three scenarios for a di⁄erent value of "￿;R. The lower
the elasticity of the probability with respect to the reserve ratio the lower need
the reserve ratio be in order to obtain a given level of no crisis probability. This
somewhat counter-intuitive result derives from the fact that we are considering -
as in reality - ratios below unity. Full coverage is here associated with a zero crisis
probability.36
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Hence, a low level of the elasticity should be associated with countries that are
presumed to require little reserves to have a high probability of no crisis. Note also
that this functional form implies that the elasticity is independent of the reserve
level. If we take the empirically more relevant functional form





and restrict ￿ = 1 ￿ ￿ to ensure that full coverage leads to a zero crisis probability
we obtain a similar pattern as depicted in the ￿gure below where we set ￿ = 0:8 and
varied the elasticity. Clearly, with such a functional form any increase in ￿ will lead
to a lower optimal reserve level while the e⁄ect of the elasticity remain unchanged.
The coe¢ cient ￿ may stand for any other factors a⁄ecting the crisis probability
such as the depth of the ￿nancial system, the export revenues relative to GDP, the
exchange rate regime, indicators of political and institutional quality etc.37
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C Derivation of the Insurance Cost
Consider the case in which the authority rather than taking the risk of ￿ uctuation in
return and prices on itself, engages in forward contracts. To this end it will have to
pay a fee. This fee is di⁄erent to the factor g which stands for the opportunity cost
which arises and the premium due to the default possibility. One way to determine
the extent of the fee is given by the notion that the counterpart to this hedging is
risk averse. Hence, we can ask how much we need to compensate the counterpart
to take on the risk, i.e. what is the risk premium of the portfolio? However, we
presume that the counterpart unlike the authority need not be liquid in the event
of a sudden stop but simply maximizes the utility form the standard portfolio. The
risk premium for the total portfolio is then given by
E [u(X)] = u(E (X) ￿ ￿)
where X is given by the level of wealth, which is the gross return on the portfolio
X =
X
￿i (1 + ri)R










For the two asset case we have
X = R + [￿r1 + (1 ￿ ￿)r2]R
where we decomposed the level of wealth in the two terms X = ￿ X + " where
" has mean zero. Accordingly, ￿ X = R + [￿E (r1) + (1 ￿ ￿)E (r2)]R and " =38
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[￿(r1 ￿ E (r1)) + (1 ￿ ￿)(r2 ￿ E (r2))]R. For a utility function of the CES class






" = R2V ar[￿r￿
1 + (1 ￿ ￿)r￿
2]
where r￿






1 + (1 ￿ ￿)r￿
2)





1) + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 V ar(r￿
2) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)
(1 + ￿E (r1) + (1 ￿ ￿)E (r2))
For the relevant assumption of V ar(r￿
1)￿V ar(r￿
2) < 0 and under E (r2) = E (r1) =





1) + (1 ￿ ￿)
2 V ar(r￿
2) + 2￿(1 ￿ ￿)Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)




1) + V ar(r￿
2)] ￿ 2V ar(r￿
2) + (2 ￿ 4￿)Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2) < 0
an increase in ￿ reduces the premium. This will be true whenever
￿ <
V ar(r￿




1) + V ar(r￿
2) ￿ 2Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)]
Hence, increasing the share of ￿ above this level leads to an increase in the premium.
For the case of E (r2) = E (r1) = E (r) we may approximate the fee by (13).
D Solving the 2-Asset Case
This implies for the maximization of (3) that the ￿rst order condition with respect
to the share ￿ is given by:
￿(R)
￿P=￿G





￿(1 ￿ ￿)V ar(r￿
2)




5 = [1 ￿ ￿(R)]h(￿)ti
and the share is given by
￿ =
V ar(r￿




1) + V ar(r￿






2(1 + E (r))h(￿)(￿G=￿P)ti
2[V ar(r￿
1) + V ar(r￿
2)] ￿ 4Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)
Given that the best an investor can do with equal expected return assets is to









2) is the optimal39
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portfolio in this context since it minimizes the risk premium (and hence maximizes
expected utility). Therefore we have that approximately:





(1 + E (r))ti
[V ar(r￿
1) + V ar(r￿
2)] ￿ 2Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)


























i ￿ ￿￿tiX (14)
where we denote the probability ratio X =
[1￿￿(R)]
￿(R) and ￿ =
h(￿)￿G
￿P . Recall that
E (r2) = E (r1) = E (r) implies E (
P
￿iri) = E (r) then ￿rst-order condition with
respect to reserves is given by
￿














Using (14) in (15) result in a quadratic equation in X of the form AX2￿BX+C = 0
where the single coe¢ cients are given by:
C = g ￿ E (r) +
h(￿)"￿;R
(1 + "￿;R)






















































where ￿ = 2(1 + E (r)) and ￿ = ￿
￿ [V ar(r￿
1) + V ar(r￿
2) ￿ 2Cov (r￿
1;r￿
2)]. For rea-
sonable parameter values the second terms of B and C are negligible since they
multiply three fractions. It is worth noting that the values of A are generally such
that A is irrelevant for the comparative statics, unless variance and covariance take
extremely high values or transaction costs become unreasonably high, since then40
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portfolio decision have stronger repercussions for the optimal reserve level. The








It can be shown that the following relationships hold (in general) @X
@￿ >,@X
@g > 0
which due to @R
@X < 0 imply that @R
@g < 0, @R
@E(r) < 0, @R
@t1 < 0 @R
@t2 < 0 and @R
@￿P < 0.
E Data
The following countries build the sample: Australia, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Columbia,
Croatia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Roma-
nia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.
Data was taken from IMF DOT, IMF COFER, IFS, Annual Reports and SDDS of
the various central banks or responsible authorities. The IMF classi￿cation and the
updated classi￿cation of Reinhard and Rogo⁄(2002) was used to determine the pegs
and the currency to which a nation pegged. The resulting anchor ordering is given
in the table below:
Anchor to Anchor to
Country EA US Country EA US
Australia 80-82 Norway 80-07*
Bulgaria 97-07 Peru 86
Canada Philippines 85-96
Chile 88-05 Romania 01-07
Colombia 80-07* Slovak Republic 94-07
Croatia 95-07 Slovenia 93-07
Iceland 84-00 Sweden 80-92
Latvia 02-07 96-01 Switzerland 83-97
Lithuania 02-07 96-01 United Kingdom 91
New Zealand Uruguay 95-7
* From 83-86 not anchoring. Discontinued in 84.
F Contribution of precautionary motives to Reserve Ac-
cumulation
The following graph is derived from the ￿rst stage regression results. It depicts
the contribution of the various aspects to the reserve accumulation by country and
year. The height of the bar is the level of the reserves to GDP ratio. While the
precautionary motive is positive for all countries the residual part can either be
negative or adding to the precautionary motive. The residual is always the light
shaded area. The precautionary motive is the distance from zero to the upper limit
of the dark shaded area, if the residual is positive and the sum of the light shaded
area and the dark shaded area when the residual is negative).41
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Australia Bulgaria Canada Chile
Colombia Croatia Iceland Latvia
Lithuania New Zealand Norway Peru
Philippines Romania Slovak Republic Slovenia
Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom Uruguay
Precautionary Residual
Contribution to Reserve Accumulation42
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